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# Virtualization: Enough Holes to Work Vegas

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# Introductory Notes

- Mostly known issues
- Mostly design flaws, not entirely bugs
- Documented behavior
- (So slightly less testing)
  - VMWare Server, not ESX or VI3.
- This is still untenable

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# Overview

- Review
  - Isolation isn't
  - Covert channels
  - Virtual machines on a network
  - Virtual machines changing the network
  - Live migration
  - Questions, heckling, grandiose proposals and accusations of hating freedom
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# Overview of Technologies

## Technology

## Example

Faster ↑

- OS Level Virt
- Paravirtualization
- Full Virt w/ HW
- Full Virt w/o HW
- Full Emulation

- Zones/UML/openVZ
- Xen
- KVM, Xen
- VMWare, KQEmu
- QEmu, Bochs

↓ Completeness

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# The Features

- Freeze / Thaw / Snapshotting
  - Decoupled Hardware
  - Another Layer of Protection
  - Live Migration
  - Dynamic Deployment / Creation
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# The Hype

- Reliability
    - No longer bound to hardware, who cares about failures!
  - Consolidation
    - Take many machines, use less of them. Better utilization of physical hardware.
  - Isolation
    - Take many tasks, isolate them from each other. Don't you feel more secure already?
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# Attacking Isolation

- Shared hardware attacks
    - Thought the SMT attacks were old news?
    - Similar things on other shared hardware
  - Attacking the host scheduler
  - Did you want to actually... use that video card? (Or other hardware device? USB?)
    - Moment you pass real hardware, you can wedge the entire box.
  - Covert Channels
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# More on Covert Channels

- Use Resources
    - Use something on one
    - Detect on another
      - RDTSC can help (or any half-decent timesource)
  - Pass data in Layer 2
    - Turns out... very few of us use EBTables.
    - Mess with Novell, use IPX
    - More of an Apple hater? Use appletalk!
    - Old School? Want to try DECNet?
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
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# Networking Issues

- Bypass host firewall
  - Pick whatever IP you'd like
  - VMWare bypasses by default in bridged mode
- Promiscuous Mode
- MAC impersonation
- Spoofing is easier again

# The VMWare Model


*(Default)*



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# The Xen Model


*(Default)*




Rest of the Network

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# The Traditional Firewall



# Network Firewall with VMs



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# Live Migration

## The Products

- Xen
- VMWare
- OpenVZ
- IBM's VM stuff

## Status

- No encryption
  - opt. hw based SSL
  - Uses SSH! ...root. :(
  - We'll find out end of '07.
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# Tool

Tool is a rather strong word, but it's available here:

<http://sdcc21.ucsd.edu/~dcapelis/vmnet.sh>

Puts VMWare's networking and allows you to use a real linux bridging system instead. This gets rid of quite a few of the lamer things VMWare does.

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# Summary

- VMs are still neat
  - The people who make VM software live in a world without attackers
  - The world is full of attackers
  - Trivial issues rarely become more trivial
  - Folks pushing VM technology need to think about the changes deployment brings. Leaving security as an implementation detail is lame.
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Questions?  
Heckling?  
Grandiose Proposals?  
Accusations?

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