# Win at Reversing

API Tracing and Sandboxing through Inline Hooking

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### Agenda

- Reverse Engineering Primer
- Approaches to Dynamic Analysis
- Inline Hooks
- Advantages Over Other Techniques
- Usages



### Reverse Engineering Primer

- Reverse Engineering techniques can be devided into two categories: Static and Dynamic Analysis
- Static Analysis
  - Techniques which do not involve running the code
  - Disassembly, file structure analysis, strings, etc.
- Dynamic Analysis
  - Techniques which involve running the code
  - Behavioral analysis




### Approaches to Dynamic Analysis

- Network Monitoring
  - Isolated Physical Networks
  - Virtual Networks
- Hardware Emulation
  - Norman Sandbox et al.
- Kernel-Level Monitoring (SSDT hooks)
  - Sysinternals' Process Monitor
- Debuggers




### Kernel-Level Monitoring





## Kernel-Level Monitoring



### Kernel-Level Monitoring

- Advantages
  - Captures every system call
  - Can't be avoided from userland
- Disadvantages
  - Only captures functions implemented as system calls
  - Not every important function call in the Win32 API is implemented as a system call
  - Tools don't differentiate between process housekeeping and calls from usercode
  - Calls to internal DLL's cannot be observed



### **Process Monitor**

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Time of Day	Process Name	PID		Path	Result	Detail	
4:02:02.4534801 PM	notepad.exe	4980	Process Start		SUCCESS	Parent PID: 2364	
4:02:02.4534954 PM	notepad.exe		Thread Create		SUCCESS	Thread ID: 5452	
4·02·02 4575638 PM	notepad.exe			:\Windows\System32\notepad.exe	SUCCESS	Image Base: 0xff960000, Image Size	
4:02:02.4577198 PM	notepad.exe			:\Windows\System32\ntdll.dll	SUCCESS	Image Base: 0x77800000. Image Siz	
4:02:02.4578910 PM	notepad.exe			:\Windows\Prefetch\NOTEPAD.EXE		Desired Access: Generic Read, Disp	
4:02:02.4579249 PM	notepad.exe			:\Windows\Prefetch\NOTEPAD.EXE		Allocation Size: 20.480. EndOfFile: 1	
4:02:02.4579644 PM	notepad.exe		The state of the s	:\Windows\Prefetch\NOTEPAD.EXE		Offset: 0, Length: 19,466, Priority: N	
4:02:02.4580232 PM	notepad.exe			:\Windows\Prefetch\NOTEPAD.EXE-	V 3 4 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	onost of congan region, thought.	
4:02:02.4580915 PM	notepad.exe	11	CreateFile C		SUCCESS	Desired Access: Read Attributes, Wr.	
4:02:02.4581422 PM	notepad.exe		QueryInformatioC		SUCCESS	VolumeCreation Time: 6/8/2009 5:05	
4:02:02.4581809 PM	notepad.exe		File SystemControl C		SUCCESS	Control: FSCTL FILE PREFETCH	
4:02:02.4583023 PM	notepad.exe			:\Windows	SUCCESS	Desired Access: Read Data/List Dir	
4:02:02.4583420 PM	notepad.exe	4980	Set Basic Inform C		SUCCESS	CreationTime: -1. LastAccessTime:	
4:02:02.4583825 PM	notepad.exe	4980	QueryFileIntem C		SUCCESS	IndexNumber: 0x10000000016a	
4:02:02.4584107 PM	notepad.exe		File SystemControl C		END OF FILE	Control: FSCTL_FILE_PREFETCH	
4:02:02 4584512 PM	notepad.exe			:\Windows	SUCCESS		
4:02:02.4588790 PM	notepad.exe	4980	CreateFile C	:\Windows\System32	SUCCESS	Desired Access: Read Data/List Dir	
4:02:02.4589177 PM	notepad.exe		SetBasicInfom C		SUCCESS	Creation Time: -1. Last Access Time:	
4:02:02.4589421 PM	notepad.exe		QueryFileIntern C		SUCCESS	IndexNumber: 0x10000000004db	
4:02:02.4589692 PM	notepad.exe		File SystemControl C		END OF FILE	Control: FSCTL FILE PREFETCH	
4:02:02.4590365 PM	notepad.exe			:\Windows\System32	SUCCESS	700000000000000000000000000000000000000	
4:02:02.4592308 PM	notepad.exe	4980	CreateFile C	:\Windows\winsxs\amd64 microsoft.w	SUCCESS	Desired Access: Read Data/List Dir	
4:02:02.4592856 PM	notepad.exe	4980	Set Basic Inform C	:\Windows\winsxs\amd64 microsoft.w.	SUCCESS	Creation Time: -1. Last Access Time:	
4:02:02.4593086 PM	notepad.exe	4980	QueryFileIntem C	:\Windows\winsxs\amd64 microsoft.w.	SUCCESS	IndexNumber: 0x1000000001a1c	
4:02:02.4593446 PM	notepad.exe			:\Windows\winsxs\amd64 microsoft.w		Control: FSCTL_FILE_PREFETCH	
4:02:02.4593728 PM	notepad.exe			:\Windows\winsxs\amd64 microsoft.w.			
4:02:02.4595196 PM	notepad.exe			:\Windows\System32\ntdll.dll	SUCCESS	Desired Access: Read Data/List Dir	
4:02:02.4595580 PM	notepad.exe	4980		:\Windows\System32\ntdll.dll	SUCCESS	Creation Time: -1, LastAccess Time:	
4:02:02.4595843 PM	notepad.exe			:\Windows\System32\ntdll.dll	SUCCESS	Attributes: A, ReparseTag: 0x0	
4:02:02.4596095 PM	notepad.exe			:\Windows\System32\ntdll.dll	SUCCESS	IndexNumber: 0x100000009d27	
4:02:02.4596344 PM	notepad.exe			:\Windows\System32\ntdll.dll	FILE LOCKED WI	SyncType: SyncTypeCreateSection,	
4:02:02.4596550 PM	notepad.exe			:\Windows\System32\ntdll.dll	SUCCESS	AllocationSize: 1,560,576, EndOfFile	
4:02:02.4597098 PM	notepad.exe			:\Windows\System32\ntdll.dll	SUCCESS	SyncType: SyncTypeOther	
4:02:02.4598263 PM	notepad.exe			:\Windows\System32\kemel32.dll	SUCCESS	Desired Access: Read Data/List Dir	
4:02:02.4599233 PM	notepad.exe	4980		:\Windows\System32\kemel32.dll	SUCCESS	Creation Time: -1, Last Access Time:	
4:02:02.4599478 PM	notepad.exe			:\Windows\System32\kemel32.dll	SUCCESS	Attributes: A. ReparseTag: 0x0	
4:02:02.4599698 PM	notepad.exe			:\Windows\System32\kemel32.dll	SUCCESS	IndexNumber: 0x10000000fd95	
4:02:02.4599942 PM	notepad.exe			:\Windows\System32\kemel32.dll		Sync Type: Sync TypeCreateSection,	
4:02:02.4600105 PM	notepad.exe			:\Windows\System32\kemel32.dll	SUCCESS	AllocationSize: 1.212.416. EndOfFile	



### Process Monitoring via Debugging

#### Advantages

- Debugger can trap any function call, not just system calls
- Trapped calls are more likely to be highly relevant to the program's operation

#### Disadvantages

- Have to act as a debugger
- Susceptible to countless anti-debugger techniques




#### Inline Hooks

#### Advantages

- Can trap any function call, not just system calls
- Trapped calls are more likely to be highly relevant to the program's operation
- Not operating as a debugger
- No device driver required
- Disadvantages
  - More of a pain in the #@! to implement



### Monitoring with Inline Hooks





### Implementing Inline Hooks

- 1. Find a function of interest
- 2. Disassemble the beginning of the function
- 3. If possible, overwrite the beginning bytes of the function with a jump or call instruction
- Implement a handler for the hooked function



### Why Disassemble?

- If you attempt to hook every function from a DLL, for example, you might run into a function such as the one below
- Inserting a 5 byte jump or call would write beyond the end of the function. ☺

#### somefunction:

```
31 CO xor eax, eax
C3 retn
```



#### A Successful Hook Install

#### original function:

```
push ebp

mov ebp, esp

81 EC 18 00 00 00 sub esp, 24

31 C9 xor ecx, ecx
```

#### hooked function:

```
E9 E4 7C FF FF jmp <handler>
18 00 00 00 ;unused
31 C9 xor ecx, ecx
```



#### What to do with hooked functions.

#### Observe and Report

- Collect data about the current function call by gathering data from stack and report to console
- Execute any instructions overwritten from the hook
- Jump back to the next instruction in the hooked function
- Intercept and Emulate
  - Perform a specified action *Instead* of calling the intended function



### Roll-your-own Sandbox

- Trap gethostbyname() to always return a fixed IP address.
- A pseudo-handle interface to allow fake reads and writes to files and netwok sockets.
  - Trap connect() to connection to a pseudo-socket.
  - CreateFile(), ReadFile(), WriteFile(), MapViewOfFile()...



#### **API** Thief

- Launches target process in a suspended state
- Injects a DLL into the process.
- The Injected DLL hooks all Win32 API functions before the target process is resumed
- API Call monitoring can be used simply with a process monitor-style console
- Imbedded python can be used to write custom handlers for specific hooked functions

Obtain API Thief at www.mandiant.com



#### API Thief Demonstration

- Basic Process Monitoring
- Basic Interception (gethostbyname)
- Pseudo-Handles demonstration
- Automated Unpacking with API Thief



## Questions?

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