

Picking Electronic Locks Using TCP Sequence Prediction

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Who am I?

- **OSCP, GPEN**
- **Network Technician for Texas State University**
- **Have been working with electronic building access systems for more years than I like to think about**

Abstract

- **Testing of security of building access systems always focused on ID cards and other authentication mediums**
 - **RFID**
 - **Magstripe**
 - **Biometrics**
- **More prevalent usage of networked building access systems means more focus needs to be put on the controllers themselves**
 - **Lack of encryption**
 - **Persistent TCP sessions**
 - **Predictable sequence numbering**


The Question

Is it possible for attackers to spoof commands to these access systems without needing an authentication medium at all?


Brief Overview of Electronic Building Access

- **Authentication devices and locking devices both connected to control system (door controller)**
- **Door controllers connected via TCP/IP to central database**
 - **Client programs used to make changes to database which are propagated down to door controllers**
 - **Status of locks/alarm points monitored remotely**
 - **Commands to lock and unlock(!!) doors can be sent across the network**

Picking the Lock




Picking the Lock




Why It Works

- **All comes down to TCP sequence prediction**
 - **Usually used to hijack TCP sessions**
 - **Guess the next sequence number, inject a packet into an existing session**
- **Has been fixed in most modern operating systems and applications**
- **Embedded systems are still notoriously bad**

TCP Sequence Prediction Illustrated



TCP Sequence Prediction Illustrated



Proof of Concept?

Conclusion

- **Breaking authentication medium not necessary to bypass networked electronic building access system**
- **Any networked device must protect itself against networking vulnerabilities**
- **These problems are not hard to fix!**
 - **You**
 - **Put door controllers on separate LAN**
 - **Monitor for MITM attacks**
 - **Vendor**
 - **Make sequence numbers harder to guess**
 - **ENCRYPT THE TRAFFIC**

The End