Anti-Forensics
and Anti-Anti-Forensics
by Michael Perklin

(But not Anti-Anti-Anti-Forensics)

(...or Uncle-Forensics...)

DEFCON
This talk will deal with a variety of complications that can arise in a digital investigation
Michael Perklin

- Digital Forensic Examiner
- Corporate Investigator
- Computer Programmer
- eDiscovery Consultant

- Basically - A computer geek + legal support hybrid
Techniques in this talk...

- Most of these techniques are NOT sophisticated
- Each one can easily be defeated by an investigator
- The goal of these techniques is to add man-hours/$$$
- High costs increase chances of settlement

Wiping a hard drive, or using steganography will not be discussed because they’ve been around for decades
Typical Methodologies:

- Copy First, Ask Questions Later
  - Typically Law Enforcement
- Assess relevance first, copy relevant
  - All types of investigators
- Remote analysis of live system, copy targeted evidence only.
  - Enterprise, Private if they have help

Methodology #1 is typically used by police
Methodology #2 is used by all types of digital investigators
Methodology #3 is typically used by Enterprise companies on their employees

“Assess Relevance” method typically searches an HDD for one of a few specific keywords. If found, the HDD is imaged for further analysis.
Create Working Copy
- Image the HDD
- Copy files remotely for analysis

Process Data
- Hash files
- Analyze Signatures

Separate Wheat
- De-NIST or De-NSRL
- Known File Filter (KFF)
- Keyword Searches

Analyze For Relevance
- Good hits or false positives?
- Look at photos, read documents, analyze spreadsheets
- Export files for native analysis
- Bookmark, Flag, or otherwise list useful things

Prepare Report
- Include thumbnails, snapshots, or snippets
- Write-up procedures (Copy/Paste from similar case to speed up workload)
- Attach appendices, lists, etc

Archive Data
- Store images on central NAS
- Shelve HDDs for future use
Classic Anti-Forensic Techniques

- HDD Scrubbing / File Wiping
  - Overwriting areas of disk over and over
- Encryption
  - TrueCrypt, PGP, etc.
- Physical Destruction

These 3 methods are fairly common amongst people like us. In reality, these are used rarely.

Each method implies guilt, and can be dealt with without tech.
Running Tallies on Slides

- Tally of # Hours Wasted will be at bottom left
- Tally of # Dollars Spent will be at bottom right
- I will assume an average rate of $300/hr for the digital investigator’s time

- Red tallies indicate costs for current technique
- Green tallies show total costs to-date

0 hours $0

$300/hr rate is fairly average for junior–intermediate investigators
Copy each device for later analysis

...or copy the file from the remote live machine
AF Technique #1
Data Saturation

- Let's start simple:
  - Own a LOT of media
  - Stop throwing out devices
  - Use each device/container regularly if possible
  - Investigators will need to go through everything

8 hours $2,400

Cell Phones
Laptops
Old HDDs
USB Keys
Burned CD/DVDs
Mitigating Data Saturation

- Parallelize the acquisition process
  - More drive duplicators = less total time
  - The limit is your budget.
- Use their hardware against them:
  - Boot from a CD, plug in a USB HDD, mount’n’copy
  - The limit is the # of their machines

8 hours  $2,400

Incidentally, the # of their machines is typically equal to the number of machines you need to copy!!
9 Machines imaging in parallel to an external USB drive.

Total time = time to image 1 drive.
Non-standard RAID controllers sometimes allow you to choose arbitrary block sizes and other parameters that would otherwise be taken care of automatically.

Less damaging for Public sector, can be very expensive for Private sector.
There are so many parameters used by RAID controllers that it can be quite time consuming to try all combinations in order to figure out the exact settings used by the original device.
Mitigating Non-Standard RAIDs

- De-RAID volumes on attacker’s own system
  - Use boot discs
  - Their hardware reassembles it for you
- If RAID controller doesn’t support Linux, use Windows
  Windows-Live CDs work well
- Image the volume, not the HDDs

16 hours $4,800

By recombining the RAID array on the attacker’s system, their hardware does all the heavy lifting for you.
All you need to worry about is copying the data to your drive.
This stage involves:
Hashing
Full-Text Indexing
File Type identification
etc.
ZIP Files: PK
EXE Files: MZ
PDF Files: PDF
AF Technique #3
File Signature Masking

- File Signatures are identified by file headers/footers
- “Hollow Out” a file and store your data inside
- Encode data and paste in middle of a binary file

- Transmogrify does this for you

0 hours $0

File signatures are identified by the first few bytes
This makes it easy to fake a file match
File Signatures (cont.)

- EXE files begin with bytes MZ
- It’s dead easy to make files match their extensions

16 hours $4,800

This TXT file shows how easy it is to make a file match its extension despite having contents that are vastly different.
Even though this txt file was created in notepad, it is recognized as a ‘Windows Executable’ because the first two characters are MZ.
**Mitigating File Signature Masking**

- Use “Fuzzy Hashing” to identify potentially interesting files
  - Fuzzy Hashing identifies similar but not identical files
  - Chances are, attacker chose a file from his own system to copy/hollow out
  - “Why does this file have a 90% match with notepad.exe?”
- Analyze all “Recent” lists of common apps for curious entries
  - “Why was rundll.dll recently opened in Wordpad?”

Fuzzy Hashing and Recent File analysis can mitigate false file signatures fairly easily by asking simple questions
#3. Separate Wheat from Chaff
Confounding the sifting process

Create Working Copy → Process Data For Analysis → "Separate Wheat from Chaff"

Analyze Data for Relevance → Prepare Report on Findings → Archive Data For Future

16 hours $4,800

Data Deduplication
Date Filtering
NSRL
De-NISTing a drive may bring 120GB of data down to about 700MB. Only user-created content will remain.

Hundreds of gigabytes can be reduced to a few hundred megabytes.
AF Technique #4
NSRL Scrubbing

- Modify all of your system and program files
- Modify a string or other part of the file
- For EXEs and DLLs: recalculate and update the embedded CRCs
- Turn off Data Execution Prevention (DEP) so Windows continues to run
- NSRL will no longer match anything

12 hours $3,600

Most files won’t need a lot of work: simply change a character and you’re good.
Executable files (DLLs, EXEs) have embedded Cyclical Redundancy Checks (CRCs) that make sure they are still good
You will need to recalculate the CRCs for these files in order to change them in a way that will keep them running
Data Execution Prevention

Validates system files,
Stops unsafe code,
Protects integrity

boot.ini policy_level
/noexecute=AlwaysOff

28 hours $8,400

DEP will stop Windows from running if it sees parts of Windows being modified.

So turn it off! You can then run your modified version of Windows without restriction.
Mitigating NSRL Scrubbing

- Search, don’t filter
- Identify useful files rather than eliminating useless files
- Use a Whitelist approach instead of a Blacklist

28 hours $8,400

Whitelist approach looks for things that match
Blacklist approach suppresses things that don’t

Use a whitelist approach
Background: Histograms

- Investigators use histograms to identify which dates have higher-than-average activity
- e.g. VPN Logins, Firewall alerts, even FileCreated times

28 hours  $8,400
AF Technique #5
Scrambled MACE Times

- All files store multiple timestamps
  - **Modified** - the last write
  - **Accessed** - the last read
  - **Created** - the file’s birthday
  - **Entry** - the last time the MFT entry was updated

- Randomize timestamp of every file
  *(Timestomp does this)*

- Randomize BIOS time regularly via daemon/service

- Disable LastAccess updates in registry

16 hours  $4,800

Most of an investigator’s “Timeline Assembly” revolve around MACE times
MACE times can be modified easily

A malicious person can modify EVERY MACE time across an entire system
LastAccess time can be disabled in two ways:

- In Windows Registry key:
  ```
  HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM
  \CurrentControlSet\Control\FileSystem
  ```
  Set DWORD `NtfsDisableLastAccessUpdate` = 1

- Open Command Prompt as Administrator:
  ```
  FSUTIL behavior set disablelastaccess 1
  ```

Two ways to suppress “Last Accessed Time” updates
Mitigating Scrambled MAC Times

- Ignore dates on all metadata
- Look for logfiles that write dates as strings
  - Logs are written sequentially
  - BIOS time changes can be identified
- Identify sets of similar times
  - Infer mini timelines for each set
  - Order sets based on what you know of that app

44 hours $13,200

Sequential logfiles can help identify timelines
This logfile shows 3 sets of similar times
It also shows the ordering of each set

The BIOS time was changed twice
Malicious MACE Times

- When all timestamps are scrambled, you know to ignore the values
- If all files appear normal, you will never know if a single file has been updated to appear consistent
- Investigative reports typically cite: “this time is consistent with that time” when describing artifacts found during analysis

44 hours  $13,200

Smart investigators never say “This occurred at this time” They say ‘Logs show it occurred at this time’ and “This time is consistent with these other logs which reference this action”
When the suite you’re using doesn’t show you everything you want to see, you typically take the file out of the image to your workstation. You can then use your own app to analyze the file.
Windows 7 still has parts of DOS in it

This won’t take up too much time but will still frustrate the investigator. He’ll likely figure out what’s wrong in less than an hour, but will bill a full hour of work for it.
Creating Restricted Filenames

- Access NTFS volume via UNC \host\C$\Folder
- Call Windows API function `MoveFile` manually from a custom app (Kernel32.lib)
- Boot from Linux with NTFS support and `mv` the file

45 hours $13,500

You can’t just create a file with a restricted name. You need to trick Windows into doing it
Mitigating Restricted Filenames

- Never export files with native filenames
  - Always specify a different name
  - FTK 4 does this by default (1.jpg)
- Export by FileID or other automatically generated name

Your analysis machine should go by your rules. You make up the filenames.
AF Technique #7
Circular References

- Folders in folders have typical limit of 255 characters on NTFS
- “Junctions” or “Symbolic Links” can point to a parent
- C:\Parent\Child\Parent\Child....
- Store criminal data in multiple nested files/folders

4 hours $1,200

When a circular reference is followed, it could cause programs to enter an infinite loop. Other programs may detect that the path they’re trying to access is > 255 characters and throw an exception.
Circular References

- Tools that use HDD images don’t bat an eye (FTK4, EnCase)
- Many tools that recursively scan folders are affected by this attack
- “Field Triage” and “Remote Analysis” methodologies are affected

Reminder: The 3 Methodologies are:
* Image Everything, Analyze Later
* Field Triage to decide what to image
* Remote Analysis, target only evidence you need
Mitigating Circular References

- Always work from an image
- Be mindful of this attack when dealing with an attacker's live system
- Just knowing about it will help you recognize it

49 hours $14,700
AF Technique #8
Broken Log Files

- Many investigators process log files with tools
- These tools use string matching or Regular Expressions
- Use \textit{fuñ ÁsçÍ} characters in custom messages
- Commas, “quotes” and |pipes| make parsing difficult
- Use eLfL (0x654c666c) in Windows Event Logs

6 hours $1,800

eLfL is the 4byte header for Windows Event Logs
It marks the start of an eventlog record

Throwing these characters in the middle of a record will confuse some parsers into thinking a new entry has begun
Mitigating Broken Log Files

- Do you need the log? Try to prove your point without it
- Parse the few pertinent records manually and document your methodology
- At worst, write a small app/script to parse it the way you need it to be parsed

51 hours  $15,300

Zeroing in on the specific records you need is a lot better than parsing the whole log
Lotus Notes uses NSF files to hold emails, similar to PST files. ID files include a user ID and an encryption key that can be unlocked with the user’s password. 2hrs per custodian.
Lotus Notes

- Most apps use IBM's own Lotus Notes dlls/API to work with NSF files
- When opening each encrypted NSF, the API raises the password dialog:
- Examiners/eDiscovery operators must select the user's ID file and type the associated password for every NSF file being processed

57 hours  $17,100

The password dialog is raised in an interactive context, even when automated. The moment the API is used to open an NSF file, this dialog is presented to the user.

This means you can’t easily script NSF processing.
Load up each NSF manually and deal with it using your own keyboard and mouse
Print the notable emails to PDF to be included in your report/affidavit
Reporting didn’t seem to have many hacks at first until I started thinking about it....
AF Technique #10
HASH Collisions

- MD5 and SHA1 hashes are used to locate files
- Add dummy data to your criminal files so its MD5 hash matches known good files
- Searching by hash will yield unexpected results

badfile.doc   e4d909c290d0fb1ca068ffaddf22cbd0
goodfile.doc  e4d909c290d0fb1ca068ffaddf22cbd0

2 hours $600

What if you match your bad stuff with rundll.dll? NSRL will suppress it!
Hash Collisions

- Of course, this would only be useful in a select few cases:
  - i.e. you stole company data and stored on a volume they could seize/search
  - Try explaining why GoodFile.doc and BadFile.doc have identical hashes to judges/justices/arbiters/non-techies
    - could provide just-the-right-amount of ‘reasonable doubt’

59 hours  $17,700
Hash Collisions (cont.)

- Lots of work has been done on this already
- Marc Stevens of the Technische Universiteit Eindhoven developed HashClash for his Masters Thesis in 2008
- Other tools that exploit this are available

59 hours $17,700

Most of the research into MD5 collisions is a result of Marc’s 2008 paper
Mitigating HASH Collisions

- Use a hash function with fewer collisions (SHA256, Whirlpool)
- Doublecheck your findings by opening each matched file to verify the search was REALLY a success
- boy would your face be red!

Always doublecheck your findings!
Never rely on hash matches to guarantee you’ve found the file you’re looking for
Using your computer without a hard drive is very easy nowadays thanks to large removable media.
Creating a “dummy service” can simulate recent usage of a computer.
Mitigating Dummy HDDs

- Always check for USB drives in USB slots AND on motherboards. They can be SMALL these days...
- Pagefile on USB drive may point to network locations (if the OS was paging at all...)
- If possible, monitor network traffic before seizure to detect remote drive location

62 hours $18,600

Look on the motherboard itself and identify every USB header. Follow all USB cables to the external ports on the case.

Don’t be fooled!
In the event a case is challenged in a year or two, firms need to archive data for the future
Technique #1
Data Saturation

- Same as Technique #1
- The more data you have, the more they need to keep
- We’ve come full circle

1 hours  $20/mo per HDD

3 HDDs per month = $60
3 HDDs per year = $720
Budget Overrun

- We've taken up roughly 63 hours of an investigator’s time
  - That’s more than 8 workdays, without overtime
  - This extra time was spent trying to image drives, export files, read email, and perform other menial tasks
  - The investigator still needs to do his regular work!
  - Increased likelihood that opposing council will settle

63 hours

$18,900 + $~720/yr
Questions

- Have you encountered frustration in your examinations?
- How did you deal with it?
- I’d love to hear about it in the speaker Q&A room!
Thanks!

- Thanks DEFCON for letting me speak
- Thanks:
  - Forensic Friends (Josh, Joel, Nick)
  - Family
  - Coworkers
  - You!
Slide Availability

- The slides on your CD are outdated
- You can grab this latest version of these slides from: http://www.perklin.ca/~defcon20/perklin_antiforensics.pdf
References


References (cont.)


- Perkin, Michael. April 26, 2012. Anti-forensics: Techniques that make our lives difficult, and what we can do to mitigate them. Presented at HTCIA Ontario Chapter, Brampton, ON, Canada.


