Stamp Out Hash Corruption, Crack All the Things!
Ryan Reynolds, Manager, Crowe Horwath, LLP
Jonathan Claudius, SpiderLabs Security Researcher, Trustwave
July 2012

Abstract

This whitepaper is to serve as a supporting reference to the DEFCON 20 talk, “Stamp Out Hash Corruption, Crack All the Things!” The focus of both the paper and presentation is to show how a number of Windows password extraction tools – Cain and Able, Metasploit, Creddump and many others – yield corrupt data when extracting password hashes from the Windows Registry. Both the paper and the presentation include the discovery process and a detailed description of the problem, as well as a solution for obtaining the correct hashes.

Content Primer

The motivation behind obtaining password hashes from Windows-based systems is very similar to obtaining password hashes from any other operating system, service or application. Generally speaking, the focus of this process is either to transform a hash into the original clear-text version of the password or to be able to use that hash directly (perhaps via the pass-the-hash technique in Windows) to either validate the security of the password itself or to escalate privileges in the context of a malicious user.

When referring to Windows-based password hashes, there are two different hash types that this paper will focus on; LAN Manager (LM)-style hashes and NT LAN Manager (NTLM)-style hashes. LM hashing is the older of the two hashing algorithms and comes with a number of security flaws:

- Passwords are not case-sensitive
- Passwords have a maximum length of 14 characters
- Passwords are split into two 7-character portions, each of which is hashed separately, drastically reducing the number of potential hash keys
- Hashes are not individually salted

NTLM hashing, being the newer of the two algorithms, is stronger than LM hashing. It eliminates the first three shortcomings, but it is still not individually salted, leaving both algorithms susceptible to pre-computed dictionary attacks.
Two methods for extracting password hashes will be discussed: memory injection into the LSASS process space ("memory injection") and reading of the SAM from the Windows Registry ("registry reading").

LSASS injection is likely the most popular method for obtaining Windows password hashes, using tools such as pwdump6 and fgdump 2.1, and is generally accepted as the traditional method of obtaining hashes. However, LSASS injection does come with its share of shortcomings:

- Modern anti-virus (AV) controls commonly prevent this method
- Potential to cause a crash in the LSASS process

Registry reading is historically less popular but has recently been considered a preferred approach, despite having been around for quite some time (approximately 18 years), because it overcomes a number of issues presented by the memory injection method:

- It is typically not obstructed by AV, as registry access is allowed as part of normal activity on a Windows system
- It does not present the system stability concerns of loading foreign DLLs into the memory of critical system processes
- Hashes can be extracted from systems that are not running by copying the appropriate hive files

**Research Motivations**

The motivation behind this research was to identify and eliminate the source of inconsistencies in Windows hashes retrieved during real-world penetration assessments.

During assessments, password hashes where often obtained by using the registry reading method. Occasionally, though, extracted hashes would appear corrupted – they did not work in pass-the-hash techniques and they could not be cracked, even when using rainbow tables. However, when reverting to using the memory injection method, as a sanity check, entirely different hashes would be received for the same accounts. LM and NTLM hashes from an example user are provided below, using both methods.

4500a2115ce8e23a99303f760ba6cc96 (BAD LM HASH)
5c0bd165cea577e98fa92308f996cf45 (BAD NTLM HASH)

Figure: 1A (via Registry Reading Method)

aad3b435b51404eaaad3b435b51404ee (LM HASH)
5f1bec25dd42d41183d0f450bf9b1d6b (NTLM HASH)

Figure: 1B (via Memory Injection Method)
Attempts to crack the hashes extracted using the memory injection method were successful in obtaining the clear-text password (“bananas” in the above example). Additionally, attempts to use the pass-the-hash technique to gain access to other systems were also successful. With this understanding, it was clear that something was wrong with the registry reading method deployed by many tools, causing them to yield incorrect hashes.

As part of this research, attempts were made to identify other individuals who had experienced similar issues. This led to the discovery of several people who had experienced this issue before and the identification of a pre-existing Metasploit Bug #4404, which describes the symptoms of the issue described above. The goal of this research was to correct this problem and patch the tools that are affected so that the information security community can more reliably obtain correct password hashes in order to assess the true state of a given system.

**Detailed Technical Description**

To understand this issue, it is important to understand where hash data is stored, how it is extracted and how it is converted into usable LM and NTLM hashes that can be processed by cracking tools such as John the Ripper (JtR).

The registry’s SAM key (a reference to the Security Accounts Manager) is the permanent storage location of security information for each local user on the system.

In taking a closer look at the SAM key, a key exists for each individual user under HKLM\SAM\SAM\Domains\Account\Users\.

Under each user's key are two registry values, “F” and “V”, each containing binary data that represent information about the user. The “F” key contains primarily policy and audit information, such as last logon, password last set, account expires, last incorrect password, and password expiration.

The “V” key – the one of particular interest – contains the username, full name, comments, home directory, hours allowed and most importantly the LM and NTLM hash data for the user. It is important to note here that the LM and NTLM hash data present in the “V” key is not the actual LM and NTLM hashes. This data needs to be translated into the LM and NTLM hash formats through a series of cryptographic algorithms, which are outside the scope of this paper, but are explained in more detail in Brendan Dolan-Gavitt’s 2008 blog post on “SysKey and the SAM” (See References).

Here is an example of the binary data stored in both the “F” and “V” keys for a user that is storing LM and NTLM hash data:

```
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\sam\sam\domains\account\users\000003ED
  F  REG_BINARY  020001000000000000000000000000000000000000000000998762B9
  F859CD01000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
```
As seen in figure 2A, the text highlighted in yellow is the LM and NTLM hash data that a tool would need to read and extract for this user. Here is another example of the exact same user, but with LM storage disabled.

As seen in Figures 2A and 2B, the contents stored within V changes, depending on whether an LM hash is present or not.

While the hash data in figures 2A and 2B has been manually found and highlighted for demonstration purposes, tools must follow a more rigorous process to know what source data to translate into actual hashes.

An extraction tool starts by determining the read offset within "V" to find the start of the hash data section. The following pseudo-code is used to reliably find the beginning of hash data section, also known as hash data offset:

1. Read 156 bytes (0x9c) into the data structure
2. Then parse the next 4 bytes as an integer(X)
3. Hash Data Offset = X + 204 bytes (0xCC)

Now that the hash data offset is known for a particular user, the remainder of the data in "V", starting at the offset, is considered the hash data section. Using the above examples (Figure 2A and 2B), a tool reads from the hash data offset to the end of the data structures and is left with the following hash data sections respectively:
The remaining data (hash data section) for both data structures change when LM hash data is not present. As seen in figures 3A and 3B, the hash data is simply stripped away and the start and end delineators (“01000100”) are still present. This means that in order for tools to properly parse hash data in both scenarios, an extraction tool needs to make a decision about whether or not the LM hash data is present or not. Most registry extraction tools, in use today and included within scope of this research, use the following parsing logic:

1. If Hash Data Section > 40 bytes (0x28) then
   - \text{noffset} = Hash Data Offset + 4 bytes (0x04)
   - \text{ntoffset} = Hash Data Offset + 20 bytes (0x14)
   - Parse as if LM and NTLM hash data are present
2. Else If Hash Data Section > 20 bytes (0x14) then
   - \text{ntoffset} = Hash Data Offset + 8 bytes (0x08)
   - Parse as if NTLM is present

\textit{Note: The above 4 byte increments used in the offset calculations are used to skip the start and end delineators that are present in the data structure.}

When a tool employs the above logic to figures 3A and 3B, the end result is the LM and NTLM hash data elements from each structure:

- \text{9AC412C7DA10C788963DF9DF7E6B5EF4 (LM HASH DATA)}
- \text{B0FD8B04845B3E6836EC62EDD3EC84CA (NTLM HASH DATA)}

\text{Figure: 4A (LM and NTLM Hash Data Stored)}

- \text{B0FD8B04845B3E6836EC62EDD3EC84CA (NTLM HASH DATA)}

\text{Figure: 4B (Only NTLM Hash Data Stored)}

As seen above, when a tool employs this logic it can accurately extract password hash data for this user. After this information is obtained by a tool, the resulting hash data can then be passed to cryptographic algorithms to decode hash data and translate into typical LM and NTLM hashes. These hashes can then be supplied to a cracking tool like John the Ripper (JtR) to obtain the clear-text passwords.

As noted previously, the above parsing logic is used by nearly all the registry-based extraction tools examined. With that in mind, a closer look at the F and V data for
an account affected by the hash corruption problem is illuminating. The following figures show an example of this:

Figure: 5A (LM and NTLM Hash Data Stored)

Figure: 5B (Only NTLM Hash Data Stored)

The primary differences in the binary data for what is stored in figures 2A and 2B versus what is stored in figures 5A and 5B are highlighted in green. This additional data is present when an administrator enables password histories (to prevent user password re-use) and the account’s password changes. Based on our observation of how the structure grows everytime a password reset occurs, this is the probable storage location of hash data for previous passwords.

Let’s now take another look at how the de-facto-standard logic that we described above is affected by this change in data structure. Assuming we use the same calculation to determine our offset, we then consider the remainder of the structure.
to be the hash data section. Below we provide the hash data section for the examples described in Figures 5A and 5B.

\[
\begin{align*}
&01000100\text{8AC412C7DA10C789563DF9DF7E6B5EF4}01000100B0FD8B04845B3E6836EC62EDD3EC84CA \\
&010001001F478C0C71D90A55AB61F922DE0EFCC21D09EE57202EDF579D32EF1DFB87E47CFFC \\
&8A835D5041DBBCD73DBB9F3E81D0C499A51D23610F8669762EBF5DF7B340F40B95639E95719E \\
&0C1B4D27C6AC2754C807AD18BC4D6777A52621B0A5A5F8B8C0AA34AC1DFCDA9054B939514CD7BA \\
&51884225D7C1C6A8E65C086C01517C522EA8B701A18584F4ED565C0100000152972638DEB345B \\
&51FF80B0CCA012BBBB5C279A405A0C24B05E98A53843488CD98264658856D656A0A07DB06FC112 \\
&9C826D74B1BA61C1F2623F9F92E0365D6262E1A0C91EDDC0C54E6A478E1065C4F38C5CF867812 \\
&16B88749BC6E08E3ADBC0E6193EF250E6C1775C8AE559A4AF784AE9DE8073464CDAA957CC67 \\
\end{align*}
\]

Figure: 6A (LM and NTLM Hash Data Stored)

\[
\begin{align*}
&0100010001000100B0FD8B04845B3E6836EC62EDD3BC84CA01000100B0FD8B04845B3E6836EC62EDD3BC84CA \\
&0100010015F478C0C71D90A55AB61F922DE0EFCC21D09EE57202EDF579D32EF1DFB87E47CFFC \\
&477B8F1C797A4CD4F07404747D0B850AB676696E6797F4E2320F7FAC2754CA807AD18BC4D7BA \\
&577A52621000010B1DCCFEB861BD51FF80B0CCA012BBBB5C279A405A0C24B05E98A53843488CD98264658856D656A0A07DB06FC112 \\
&9C826D74B1BA61C1F2623F9F92E0365D6262E1A0C91EDDC0C54E6A478E1065C4F38C5CF867812 \\
\end{align*}
\]

Figure: 7A (LM and NTLM Hash Data Stored)

When we check the size of both hash data sections, for Figures 6A and 6B, they are both greater than 40 bytes (0x28) in length. What this means is that, regardless of whether LM hash data is present, we will always parse the hash data section as if LM and NTLM hash are present. If we follow this logic, then we end up parsing the following hash data from Figures 6A and 6B.

\[
\begin{align*}
&9AC412C7DA10C789563DF9DF7E6B5EF4 \text{(LM HASH DATA)} \\
&B0FD8B04845B3E6836EC62EDD3EC84CA \text{(NTLM HASH DATA)} \\
\end{align*}
\]

Figure: 7B (Only NTLM Hash Data Stored)

As seen in Figure 7A, this logic correctly parsed V data that contained LM and NTLM hashes, even with historical password hashes stored. However, Figure 7B shows that this logic does not correctly parse the data when it contains historical password hashes and only a NTLM hash.

It is that point that leads to the crux of the issue, the flawed assumption that a hash data length greater than 40 bytes indicates the presence of both LM and NTLM hashes. Under this flawed assumption, a tool tasked with parsing an NTLM hash only, followed by historical password hashes, will always incorrectly parse what it believes to be the first hash (actually only part of the hash), since it is using the incorrect offset. It will also then attempt to parse a second hash but get completely junk data because it is reading into another data structure (the historical hashes).
This issue has gone undetected by many extraction tools due to the fact the corrupted data is just hash source data, which is then passed to cryptographic functions which result in a corrupted LM and NTLM hash as described in Figures 1A and 1B. This explains why the resulting LM and NTLM hashes look and feel like valid hashes, however, they are not a true representation of the users encrypted password.

After discovering root of the issue, an alternate algorithm was pursued to work for scenarios with or without the additional data (shown in green in examples 7A, 7B, 6A, 6B, 5A, 5B). What was learned was that earlier in the "V" data structure for each user there are the header values that describe what hash data is being stored for the user. The following figures show the highlighted header values that describe whether the LM or NTLM hash data is present.

Figure: 8A (LM and NTLM Hash Data Stored)

Figure: 8B (Only NTLM Hash Data Stored)
When examining these header values that describe whether or not a hash is present for either LM or NTLM, as seen in the above Figures 8A and 8B in blue, two values are present that when unpacked result in either a 0x04 or a 0x14. If 0x04, this means that a hash is not present and if 0x14, this means that a hash is present. Knowing this, a modified parsing algorithm was developed to work as follows:

1. Read 160 bytes (0xA0) from beginning of data structure
2. Then parse the next 4 bytes as an integer(lm_header)
3. Read 172 bytes (0xAC) from beginning of data structure
4. Then parse the next 4 bytes as an integer(nt_header)
5. Read 156 bytes (0x9c) from beginning of data structure
6. Then parse the next 4 bytes as an integer(X)
7. Hash Data Offset = X + 204 bytes (0xCC)
8. If lm_header == 20 then
   a. lm_exists = true
   b. lm_offset = Hash Data Offset + 4
   c. Parse LM
9. If nt_header == 20 then
   a. If lm_exists
      i. nt_offset = Hash Data Offset + 24
      ii. Parse NTLM
   b. Else
      i. nt_offset = Hash Data Offset + 8
      ii. Parse NTLM

Using the above logic, a tool will parse Figures 8A and 8B to obtain the correct hash data even with additional data present at the end of the data structure.

Figure: 9A (LM and NTLM Hash Data Stored)

Figure: 9B (Only NTLM Hash Data Stored)
As seen in figures 9A and 9B, the respective LM and NTLM hash header elements indicate (via 0x04 or 0x14) whether the hash exists or not, so a tool can now make the correct parsing decisions when it comes to reading through the hash data section. Once a tool applies the final steps (5-7 listed above), the correct hash data is obtained for both examples as follows:

- 9AC412C7DA10C78B963DF9DF7E6B5EF4 (LM HASH DATA)
- B0FD8B04845B3E6836EC69726DE3F84CA (NTLM HASH DATA)

Figure: 10A (LM and NTLM Hash Data Stored)

- B0FD8B04845B3E6836EC69726DE3F84CA (NTLM HASH DATA)

Figure: 10B (Only NTLM Hash Data Stored)

Affected Tools and Origins

A large number of tools, which extract hashes from the registry were considered as part of this research. Tools that were confirmed as producing corrupted hashes when using the registry extraction method were as follows:

- Metasploit Hashdump Script
- Creddump
- Samdump2 1.0.1
- Cain and Able
- Pwdump
- Pwdump5
- Pwdump7
- FGDump 3.0
- I0phtrcrack 6.0

Of these tools, there was a mix of both open-source and closed-source projects. By examining the source code from the open source tools, the hashes they produced and the hashes produced from the closed source tools, it was clear that similar logic was used by all of them, which resulted in the same incorrect hashes.

In tracing the origin of these tools, it was determined that Pwdump version 1 (Pwdump) was likely the first tool to reverse engineer the process of gathering hashes from the registry.

Being that Pwdump was an open-source tool, it was clearly a source of information and inspiration for other new tool authors that eventually began using this approach and associated logic for parsing registry data. By reading through tool change logs, blog posts and other online sources, the following relationship diagram was constructed to show how Pwdump had influenced these tools and how it’s influence spread through generations of tools.
Although these relationships are important in showing how all these tools ended up using the similar logic, it is equally if not more important to understand the chronological time-line of when these tools were developed as seen in the following diagram.

The above diagram contains two entries for samdump2 because in 2007, samdump2 identified that a flaw existed and developed a code fix for this issue in their 1.1.1 release. Ironically, 5 years later the tools that Samdump2 helped influence directly or indirectly, still (at the time of this writing) use the incomplete logic as implemented in the 1.0.1 release of Samdump2 and Pwdump version 1 as discussed in the technical section of this paper.

Conclusions and Take Aways

Security professionals that are using extraction tools to obtain password hashes from Windows-based systems via the registry are regularly receiving corrupted
hashes. This is due to a logic flaw used by many tools that was described in detail within this whitepaper.

In addition to the identification of the flaw and its history, patches have been developed for both Metasploit and Creddump, which are both open-source. The goal here was to ensure that many of the tools described here are updated to utilize the improved logic described in this paper. To this end, an active outreach to closed-source tool developers in this space, such as Cain and Able, L0phtcrack, Pwdump7 and Fgdump, is already underway and some of these updates are already in development and should be available soon.
Definition of Terms

Hash – The actual password hash (LM or NTLM) that is generated from Hash Data that represents the encrypted form of a clear-text password. This is what can be directly supplied to a cracking tool such as John the Ripper (JtR).

Hash Data – The source (or seed) data that is stored within the registry key “V” for each user that is transformed into either a LM or NTLM hash through a series of cryptographic algorithms. This data alone cannot be directly supplied to a cracking tool such as John the Ripper (JtR).

Hash Data Section – A subset of the V key stored in the SAM hive for each user that contains hash data, which has yet to be parsed into hash data elements.
References


